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I examine John Polkinghorne’s account of how God acts in the world, 
focusing on how his ideas developed with the consideration of the notion 
of kenosis, and how this development was not a rejection of his previous 
ideas, but on the contrary a fulfilling of his own personal philosophical 
and theological insights. Polkinghorne’s thought can be distinguished in 
three different periods:1) divine action as input of active information (1988-
2000/2001);2) Polkinghorne’s reception of the notion of kenosis (2000-
2004);3) Polkinghorne’s ‘thought experiment’ approach to his ideas on 
divine action (2004- ). Finally, I consider the question of internal coherence 
of this theological development, focusing on the transition from the first to 
the second period, which I believe to be the most significant.
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One of the most important contributions that John Polkinghorne has made 
to the dialogue between science and theology is his reflections on divine 
action in the universe. His main concern is to give a properly informed 
account of the interaction of divine providence with natural causality. Two 
principles guide his pursuit: the Christian certainty that God acts and 
guides the world according to his plan;1 and the certainty that science is 
a powerful tool in explaining the universe. Hence, he tries to solve the 
tension that seems to arise inevitably between these two statements by 
claiming that, on the one hand God’s influence should make a real differ-
ence, and on the other hand, that if God is to act in the world this action 
should not be an intervention against, but an interaction with the grain of 
the universe.2
Contemporary science appears to provide a causally open view of na-
ture. Hence, Polkinghorne and many other scholars have proposed innova-
1 Polkinghorne, J. Belief in God in an Age of Science, New Haven-London: Yale University 
Press (1998), p. 49.
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Perspectives on Divine Action, Rome-Berkeley: Vatican Observatory-CTNS (2001), pp. 181-
190 (p. 188); ‘Kenotic creation and divine action’, in Polkinghorne, J. (ed.), The Work of Love, 
London: SPCK (2001), p. 100; Science and the Trinity, London: SPCK (2004), pp. 5, 84; The 
Intertwining of Science and Religion, London: SPCK (2005), p. 35; Theology in the Context of 
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tive theological theses to account for God’s special action:3 given that the 
causal chain in the world is not a closed one, there seems to be ‘space’ for 
God to act. The search for these spaces where God can act is the research 
programme that Robert J. Russell named NIODA: non-interventionist, 
objective, divine action. Polkinghorne belongs to this programme, even 
though his account is different from that of Russell.4
My goal is to examine Polkinghorne’s account of how God acts in the 
world, focusing on how his ideas developed with the inclusion of the notion 
of kenosis, and how this development was not a rejection of his previous 
ideas, but on the contrary a fulfilling of his own personal thought. It is 
not, then, my goal to evaluate the merits of each of these stages, but to 
consider why these stages follow from one another. I argue that Polking-
horne’s thought can be distinguished in three different periods: 1) divine 
action as input of active information (1988-2000/2001); 2) Polkinghorne’s 
reception of the notion of kenosis (2000-2004); 3) Polkinghorne’s ‘thought 
experiment’ approach to his ideas on divine action (2004- ).5 This division 
into periods should not be taken as a sharp and radical change of mind. 
On the contrary, as I will state by the end, the continuity in his thought 
is remarkable, and it reinforces my thesis of his coherent development of 
ideas. Nevertheless, it will be beneficial to distinguish them first in order 
to show the intimate unity of Polkinghorne’s thought as a whole. Showing 
that unity will be the goal of the last section, which will be devoted to 
consideration of the question of internal coherence within this theological 
development, focusing on the transition from the first to the second period, 
which I believe to be the most significant. I will finish by commenting 
briefly on the step towards the third period.
on	Polkinghorne’s	development	of	ideas
Polkinghorne on Divine Action and Chaos Theory (1988-2000/2001)
Although Polkinghorne started his theological career a few years before 
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1988, it was only then that the topic of divine action in nature emerged in 
his writing, as a result of the 1987 conference on Physics, Philosophy and 
Theology organised by George Coyne at the Vatican Observatory. After 
that, Polkinghorne participated actively in discussions on scientific per-
spectives on divine action.6
According to Polkinghorne, in the twentieth century quantum and cha-
os theories showed how the clockwork universe of classic mechanics was 
outmoded. He affirmed that the study of exquisitely sensitive dynamical 
systems showed that most of what we have to deal with in macroscopic 
physics is intrinsically unpredictable,7 even if the equations that describe 
them are strictly deterministic. The key issue is that the evolution of those 
systems depends so much upon the initial conditions that the slightest 
change in those conditions will make the systems develop in a completely 
different way. The possibilities, however, for the future development of a 
system are contained within certain limits, so it cannot develop with abso-
lute randomness and chaos. Thus, chaos theory gives a picture of behav-
iour which depicts a structured randomness, an ordered disorder.8 Polk-
inghorne, making use of his famous principle that ‘epistemology models 
ontology’, interprets chaos theory by explaining that the universe presents 
an open grain towards the future: ‘The world is made up of systems that 
are so exquisitely sensitive to circumstance that the smallest disturbance 
will produce large and ever-growing changes in their behaviour.’9
It does not matter in these chaotic systems which path the system fol-
lows, for the energy is the same: the different possible futures are not 
discriminated from each other by energetic considerations.10 Thus Polk-
inghorne makes a crucial step: if we want to be faithful to the principle of 
sufficient reason, which requires a reason by which to discriminate among 
the different possible paths, new top-down organising causal principles 
must be at work in order to bring about the future by complementing the 
energetic causality.11 Polkinghorne asserts that the character of these 
principles is twofold: 1) they do not act through energetic causality, but 
only through input of active information; 2) they operate holistically, given 
that chaotic systems can never be isolated.12 ‘Active information’ repre-
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sents the influence which brings about the formation of a structure pattern 
of future dynamical behaviour:13 while ‘active’ is used to describe its causal 
efficacy and ‘information’ the pattern-forming behaviour.14 The notion of 
information input is therefore necessary to resolve what actually occurs, 
becoming the vehicle for top-down operating causality and a possibility to 
accommodate human and divine agency.15 Polkinghorne, then, concludes 
that there should be a flow of information from God to the universe by 
which God guides it providentially.16
At this stage Polkinghorne argues that God’s activity is conceived as 
pure information input and that it involves no exchange of energy between 
God and the universe. This idea stems from the rejection of any account 
of divine action that would violate the conservation of energy principle.17 
This account, according to Polkinghorne, delivers ‘the concept [of divine 
action] from the theologically unacceptable character of making God just 
an invisible cause among physical causes’.18
Polkinghorne’s kenotic approach to divine action (2000-2004)
It is in his work around the change of the millennium that Polkinghorne 
starts reconsidering issues about kenotic theology. In his Faith, Science, 
and Understanding of 2000 he shows his willingness to leave aside his 
concerns about the ontological status of God’s action. He states that after 
thinking about the issue through the lens of Moltmann’s ideas on keno-
sis, these concerns were no longer as strong as before. The idea that the 
‘Creator self-limits divine power in allowing the created-other to be truly 
itself ’19 is compelling for Polkinghorne when considering how evolutionary 
theory can be accommodated with the idea of a loving God who creates an 
autonomous reality. Thus, he claims that ‘[s]uch a degree of setting aside 
of total divine control is perceived to be fitting for the God whose character 
is love and whose nature would be incomplete with the exercise of a cosmic 
tyranny’.20
Therefore, he finally suggests that ‘divine self-emptying extends to a 
kenosis of the status of agency, so that the special providence is exercised 
as a cause among causes.’21
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In this early work, however, Polkinghorne’s thought was not fully de-
veloped and he kept on questioning whether this idea could be theologi-
cally tenable, while identifying this divine activity with the input of active 
information of his first period. It is in his paper in the volume The Work 
of Love, which he edited in 2001, where he entirely accepts this new no-
tion of divine activity, explicitly claiming that this new proposal ‘would 
modify significantly my previous position’.22 As he explains, ‘divine kenosis 
can then be understood as having four dimensions – relating to the self-
limitation of divine power, of divine eternity, of divine knowledge, and 
of divine participation in the causal nexus of creation’.23 The reasons for 
accepting the importance of focusing on kenotic theology are presented in 
this essay in the following terms:
it is also necessary to consider, so to speak, what are God’s motives 
that lie behind this great act [of creation]. Pursuing that point surely 
involves appeal to the divine love that has willed the existence of the 
truly other so that, through creation, this love is also bestowed outside 
the perichoretic exchange between the Persons of the Holy Trinity. 
Creation exists because God gives to it a life and a value of its own’.24
It is a giving away of God’s own love into something other than the God-
head which motivates the reality of creation, and this movement of God’s 
love is explained by the notion of ‘kenosis’.
Polkinghorne sees a tension between the loving God and the all-power-
ful God.25 This tension is resolved ‘by maintaining God’s total benevolence 
but qualifying, in a kenotic way, the operation of God’s power’, which is, of 
course, ‘a self-qualification exercised within the divine nature and in ac-
cordance with that nature itself.’26 Thus, ‘God’s providential guiding power 
must surely also be part of the unfolding of evolutionary history.’27
As stated above, for Polkinghorne the existence of extensive intrinsic 
unpredictabilities, both in the realm of quantum physics and in that of 
chaotic dynamics, provides potential places for the operation of additional 
active causal principles in bringing about the future by complementing 
the exchange of energy among constituents of the system. In his first 
period, Polkinghorne wants to distinguish God’s action from creatures’ 
action with ‘the contrast between God’s acting through pure information 
input, while creaturely acts involve a mixture of energetic and informa-
tional causalities.’28 In this second period, however, Polkinghorne consid-
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ers closely the implications of kenotic theology, exemplified in the central 
event of the Incarnation, in which ‘God submitted in the most drastic way 
to becoming a cause among causes’. This event ‘suggest[s] what charac-
ter that governance [of the universe] might, at all times, be expected to 
take’.29 Polkinghorne concludes that the interweaving of providential and 
creaturely causalities implies ‘a picture of undisentangleability [which] 
corresponds to God’s loving choice to be a present cause among causes … 
this kenotic providential causality is also exercised energetically as well as 
informationally’.30
God is accordingly understood, through the analysis of the notions of 
kenotic theology, to be a cause among causes that acts through energetic 
exchange of information. This is a surprising statement, given that up to 
this point Polkinghorne stated that God only acted through input of pure 
information without any exchange of energy, both to secure God’s distinc-
tiveness and to affirm God’s spiritual character. Nevertheless, Polking-
horne warns us against rejecting these conclusions too fast saying in the 
last paragraph of his essay that ‘sometimes this [way of thinking] may 
lead us to what may initially seem strange conclusions. To think of God’s 
providence as acting as a cause among causes may be one of these. Kenotic 
theology is inevitably paradoxical theology, for it is founded on the concept 
of the humility of God.’31 It is thus that, in this second period, alongside his 
considerations of kenosis of omnipotence, of simple eternity and of omnis-
cience, Polkinghorne adds a new consideration of kenosis of causal status.
Polkinghorne’s ‘thought experiment’ approach (2004- )
Even though Polkinghorne continued to refer to his ideas published in 
Belief in God in an Age of Science (1998a) and Faith, Science, and Un-
derstanding (2000) for his account of chaos and divine action, and in The 
Work of Love (2001) for his thought on the relationship between kenosis 
and divine action,32 it seems clear that from 2004, in Science and the Trin-
ity, onwards he changes his language when referring to these topics. This 
change of tone in his expressions may well signify a change in mind: a 
modest way of approaching the mystery of divine action, especially having 
in mind his conclusions on the kenosis of the causal status of the divine. 
Even though he does mention his essay in The Work of Love and his previ-
ous ideas on divine action, it is no longer a strong and bold statement, but 
a rather more cautious, humble, proposition. This language becomes more 
evident in later works, in particular in his work Theology in the Context of 
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Science, from 2008.33 I do not want to claim that Polkinghorne repudiates 
his previous thought in this last period, but that he is taking a step for-
wards by examining and reflecting upon them. In this sense, Polkinghorne 
does not offer a new understanding of divine action, giving up his previous 
ideas, but enters a new path of thinking by changing the ways he speaks 
about it.
Polkinghorne starts considering the inadequacy of our scientific con-
cepts to articulate the subtle nature of the causal nexus of the universe, 
and claims that ‘we are just beginning to learn something about the de-
tailed behaviour of genuinely complex systems’.34 Confident that this state 
of ignorance is only provisional, Polkinghorne affirms: ‘I expect that the 
science of the twenty-first century will be characterised by its making 
dynamic pattern, and the information that specifies that pattern, a fun-
damental category in scientific vocabulary, alongside the traditional con-
cepts of matter and energy … thereby adding to the portfolio of our causal 
imagination the concept of active information.’35 Given these expectations, 
Polkinghorne sees it plausible to admit a belief in God’s providence act-
ing within the open grain of nature, capable of receiving pattern-forming 
information.36 It is worth noting, however, that there is no explicit treat-
ment of how this kenotic divine action takes place, of what the mechanism 
is by which God acts in nature. On the contrary, he claims that ‘God acts 
through something like a constant persuasive re-directing’.37
This change of tone is stressed in 2008, when Polkinghorne states that 
this strategy of looking at the openness of the universe is at least sufficient 
to ‘defeat the defeaters’38 by showing that the world is not totally causally 
closed. He claims that ‘it was also possible, using the idea of some form of 
genuine top-down causality, to find a hint of how it might be that divine 
providence could also be understood to be at work in history, shaping its 
unfolding development through the input of some generalised form of in-
formation into the open grain of nature’.39
It is in this context of ‘hints’, ‘generalised forms’, ‘mights’ and ‘could-bes’ 
that Polkinghorne makes his final step in his reflections on divine action. 
Surprisingly, he partly dismisses the proposals for understanding divine 
action through chaotic systems or quantum events:
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In seeking to explore these possibilities, different people focused ini-
tially on different loci of intrinsic unpredictability, some looking to 
quantum indeterminacy and others to chaotic uncertainty. None of 
these attempted models should be taken with undue seriousness. They 
are what a physicist would call ‘thought experiments’ – attempts to 
explore and try out ideas in a simplified way, rather than purporting to 
be complete solutions to the problem of divine action.40
Nevertheless, he does not get rid of these thought experiments completely 
and considers them to have some intrinsic value: ‘Yet the thought ex-
periments were worthwhile … Interpreting intrinsic unpredictabilities as 
signs of ontological openness to the operation of other causal principles 
affords just such necessary room for manoeuvre. So an important point 
was being made by this exploratory work.’41 The importance lies in the 
fact that if there is to be any kind of purposive agency in the universe, the 
causal network should be open to such an influence: ‘While we are not in 
a position to identify uniquely and exhaustively the causal joints by which 
agency might be exercised’,42 we still need to recognise that this agency is 
exercised through this openness.
In this third period, by showing that science has not finished its quest 
to understand and explain the world and that all we have so far provides 
for an open account of the universe, Polkinghorne argues for a God who 
interacts within its open grain. There is no mention, however, of how that 
activity is carried out in a kenotic way, or of the causal status of this divine 
action, or even of a localisation of the causal joint where divine and natu-
ral action meet. In conclusion, the preoccupation with showing whether 
God’s acting is a cause among causes or whether God acts through input 
of information or energetic exchange has disappeared from Polkinghorne’s 
writings during this final period.
on	Polkinghorne’s	internal	coherence
We must now consider the steps from the first to the second periods and, 
subsequently, from the second to the third, to explore whether Polking-
horne is philosophically coherent while theologically motivated. The ques-
tion is whether there might be any philosophical argument that could 
show us that Polkinghorne’s views on divine action render God a cause 
among causes even before he turns to kenotic theology.
During the first period Polkinghorne is aware of the danger of drifting 
into that conclusion, and in many places he wants to avoid such a charac-
terisation of divine causality. He does this by asserting that God’s direct 
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activity in the world is characterised by input of pure active information 
without energetic exchange. Thus, while a natural cause is that which 
acts through an exchange of energy and information, the divine cause acts 
only through information input. It is my argument that this distinction 
is not sufficient to prevent God’s being a cause among causes, and that 
this is the philosophical reason Polkinghorne turned to his second period 
characterised by kenotic theology.
In his account, Polkinghorne presents two different forms of causation: 
energetic and informational (remember his statement in 2001 quoted 
above: ‘the contrast between God’s acting through pure information input, 
while creaturely acts involve a mixture of energetic and informational 
causalities’).43 The first is that which is a common part of any physicist’s 
experience and involves interactions in a bottom-up sense. The latter is 
the input of pattern formation that relates to the behaviour of the whole. 
This approach of information input, then, avoids problems with the law 
of conservation of energy.44 Now, is there any input of active information 
without energetic exchange that can be considered a natural cause? No-
where does Polkinghorne make clear how divine action through active in-
formation input works,45 and he only claims that it is not to be understood 
as a natural cause, at least before he turns to kenotic theology. I will, then, 
attempt to illustrate philosophically that Polkinghorne’s understanding of 
input of information requires conceiving God as acting as a natural cause.
The best strategy to show that Polkinghorne cannot avoid admitting 
that God acts as a created cause is to recognise that Polkinghorne is work-
ing with a univocal notion of causality, which denies him any metaphysical 
elasticity to differentiate God’s causality from natural, created, causality. 
Aquinas, for example, used analogical notions to refer to God, in particular 
in his treatment of divine causality. With this analogical treatment he 
was able to distinguish different created causes (e.g. the four Aristotelian 
causes) and divine causality, to which he referred in terms of efficient and 
final cause, though pointing towards the similarities and dissimilarities 
natural and divine causality have. What I want to argue is that Polking-
horne, during his first period, is not using the notions of contemporary 
science (chaos theory) in the same analogical way in which Aquinas used 
Aristotelian notions of causality. Polkinghorne is addressing divine action 
by using the notions of causality that science presents in a univocal way. 
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That is precisely why he, and others, try to find a place where created 
causality is absent for God to act, the place where nature presents some 
‘space for manoeuvre’. In Polkinghorne’s own words: ‘If we thought it as 
unproblematic that God could thus fix the outcome of events, as we believe 
it to be unproblematic that an author has control over the arrangement 
of his plot, we should not write so many books about God’s action in the 
world.’ 46
In the end, this is the ultimate reason for which God is considered to 
be acting as a natural cause: metaphysically speaking to be a cause is 
to influence some event to develop in this or that way, according to what 
science says. This is, as I suggest, a univocal notion that is applied both 
to God and to creatures, which renders God to act as a created cause.47 
And it is on this that my contention that the conclusion that God is to be 
conceived of as a cause among causes in Polkinghorne’s first period stands. 
As shown above, in The Work of Love, paradigmatic of his second period, 
Polkinghorne claims that it is possible to think that ‘kenotic providential 
causality is also exercised energetically as well as informationally’.48 I 
have not been able to find this audacious statement anywhere else in Polk-
inghorne’s writings (at least those to which I have access), which makes 
me think not only that he changed his mind regarding kenotic energetic 
providence, but also that he realised that kenotic informational providence 
was enough to consider God as being a cause among causes.
What this conclusion suggests is that Polkinghorne was philosophically 
coherent in his move towards a kenotic theological understanding of di-
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vine action. His motivations and argumentation, on the other hand, were 
theological. He says it clearly: after seriously considering the kenotic act of 
creation, he saw it necessary to apply this notion of kenosis even to God’s 
causal status when interacting with nature. Nevertheless, I wonder to 
what extent he was aware that something like the argument I presented 
could be formulated. Several intimations in his writings suggest this: he 
was always concerned, during his first period, with the possibility of reach-
ing the conclusion that God acts as a cause among causes.
A comment is still due regarding Polkinghorne’s final step towards 
his third period. As was presented earlier, in this period he softened his 
language on divine action, expressing that accounts provided through 
quantum mechanics or chaos theory were to be seen as ‘thought experi-
ments’, and were not to be taken too seriously. I suspect that this change 
of perspective was mainly caused by his thought’s major transition to 
kenotic theology, and his confronting the mystery of the history of God’s 
relationship with the created universe, in particular to human beings. 
Even though God could decide to relinquish his omnipotence, his eternity, 
his causal status and his omniscience, God is still God. And God’s ways 
are not human ways, and God’s ways are always mysterious. Polkinghorne 
himself states that ‘the more subtle approach that has proved necessary in 
science bears a degree of cousinly relationship to theology’s wrestling with 
the mystery of deity’.49
Could this be seen as a final surrender to his attempts to finding and 
elucidating the causal joint between divine providence and the created 
world, even in terms of helping to provide grounds for motivated belief? It 
is well known that Polkinghorne has persistently protested against Austin 
Farrer’s attitude towards this quest. Polkinghorne argues that Farrer’s 
doctrine of double agency (primary and secondary causality) is not enough 
to explain God’s action in the world. This way of understanding God’s ac-
tion in the world is affirmed by faith and remains ineffable and veiled from 
the eyes of human reason. He notes that there is no explanation given on 
how this primary causality works,50 rendering it unintelligible. He sug-
gests that it is a fideistic solution to the problem, which in the end is more 
an evasion than a solution. It is imperative, he believes, not to give up the 
search for the causal joint where God’s action joins nature’s actions.51
Is Polkinghorne finally giving up on this search? Does this more humble 
language not mean that Polkinghorne is, in the end, surrendering to Far-
rer’s fideism? I think not. Polkinghorne is being cautious, though getting 
ready to assess the problem again as soon as science further develops in its 
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explanation of the world. We need to remember that the first idea of this 
third period is that we are mostly ignorant about the actual processes of 
the universe, but the second is a hopeful expectation that this will change. 
Scientific theories provide a good approximation to reality, but, given the 
state of contemporary science, it is better to wait before continuing with 
the theological enterprise of explaining the causal joint for divine provi-
dential action.52
In order to understand Polkinghorne’s thought in a clearer and more 
thorough manner, I have distinguished three periods: there is first a pro-
posal of divine action by information-input; there is an acceptance, due 
to kenotic theology, that this strategy renders God to be a cause among 
causes; finally, this strategy is regarded as ‘thought experiments’. These 
distinctions show that there is a clear development of Polkinghorne’s 
thought in this matter. Nevertheless, even though I propose this three-
period scheme, it must be said that Polkinghorne’s development of ideas 
are in essential continuity.
This is shown by the fact that Polkinghorne was always aware of the 
provisional and unfinished character of our scientific theories, and of the 
awe-inspiring and ineffable mystery of God, characteristic of the third pe-
riod. These topics are in his works from the early stages of his first period 
and before. I believe that these facts do not go against my division but on 
the contrary reinforce my hypothesis. The development between his first 
and second periods was internally consistent because kenosis appears as 
a sufficient framework in which to place God as a cause among causes. 
And his transition from the second period to the third is also consistent: 
although he recognises the limitations of science, he also awaits the sci-
entific developments of the twenty-first century, and thus is not giving up 
on his quest.
Assessing the problem of divine action in the created universe, Polking-
horne felt compelled to address what science has to say about causality, 
action and agency. This led him along a path of thought which, when it 
intersected with that of kenotic theology, changed and developed. What I 
have suggested in this paper is that this development of thought, in which 
three periods can be distinguished, followed Polkinghorne’s continuous 
intense interest in elucidating how the divine and the creature interact.
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